The Strange Double Life of Canadian Equality Rights by Ryder, Bruce




Volume 63 (2013) Article 11
The Strange Double Life of Canadian Equality
Rights
Bruce Ryder
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, bryder@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Ryder, Bruce. "The Strange Double Life of Canadian Equality Rights." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional
Cases Conference 63. (2013).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol63/iss1/11
 
The Strange Double Life of Canadian 
Equality Rights 
Bruce Ryder* 
I. DOCTRINAL DIVERGENCE: THE LAW AND MEIORIN  
RULINGS OF 1999 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada issued two important rulings 
on equality rights that ambitiously sought to reshape the law in their 
respective realms. One, Law v. Canada,1 concerned constitutional 
equality rights. The other, British Columbia (Public Service Employee 
Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU (“Meiorin”),2 involved statutory 
equality rights. The contrast between how the Court approached the task 
of defining equality rights in these two realms was stark. 
In Law, the Court dismissed a challenge brought by Nancy Law, 
based on section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 
to provisions of the Canada Pension Plan that denied her a survivor pen-
sion because she was under the age of 35 at the time of her spouse’s 
death. Ms. Law could have sought redress through the Canadian Human 
Rights Act, which, like the anti-discrimination statutes in every Canadian 
jurisdiction, prohibits age discrimination in the provision of services, a 
prohibition that applies to both private and public actors.4 She chose in-
stead to pursue her claim in court based on the Charter. 
                                                                                                             
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. 
1 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. 
2 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia 
Government and Service Employees’ Union (BCGSEU) (“Meiorin Grievance”), [1999] S.C.J. 
No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Meiorin”]. 
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
4 See s. 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6; Canada Pension Plan, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8. 
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The provisions challenged in Law imposed differential treatment on 
the basis of age, a ground of discrimination listed in section 15. Justice 
Iacobucci, writing for a unanimous Court, took the opportunity to de-
velop an elaborate theory for determining when disadvantageous 
distinctions drawn on prohibited grounds are discriminatory and thus 
infringe section 15(1). On the test he put forward, Nancy Law had to es-
tablish that a reasonable person in her position would find that the 
legislative imposition of differential treatment had the effect of demean-
ing her human dignity.5 The inquiry into human dignity in turn required a 
consideration of four contextual factors.6 Justice Iacobucci’s 10-point 
summary of the general approach consumed five pages in the Supreme 
Court Reports.7 He concluded that the challenged provisions took into 
account a correspondence between the age of a surviving spouse and the 
existence of long-term financial need.8 For this reason, the provisions did 
not demean the dignity of relatively young surviving spouses, and there-
fore did not amount to discrimination. Since the claimant had not 
established an infringement of section 15(1), the government was not 
called upon to justify the challenged legislation pursuant to section 1 of 
the Charter. 
Six months later, the Court issued its ruling in Meiorin. The case in-
volved a challenge by Tawney Meiorin, a forest firefighter, to her 
dismissal after she failed to pass a mandatory aerobic test introduced by 
the government. Ms. Meiorin argued that the aerobic standard discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex as women had more difficulty meeting it than 
men. Because she was employed by the government and was challenging 
a government policy, Ms. Meiorin could have based her challenge on 
section 15(1) of the Charter, and sought a remedy in court. She chose 
instead to pursue her claim before the British Columbia Human Rights 
Tribunal, relying on the statutory prohibition on sex discrimination in 
employment set out in the B.C. Human Rights Code.9 
Writing for a unanimous Court in Meiorin, McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) had no difficulty concluding that the aerobic test was 
                                                                                                             
5 Supra, note 1, at para. 75. 
6 The four contextual factors are: (1) pre-existing disadvantage; (2) the correspondence 
between the ground of discrimination at issue and the relevant characteristics or circumstances of the 
claimant; (3) the ameliorative purpose or effects of the challenged law or policy; and (4) the 
importance of the interest at stake. Id., at paras. 62-75. 
7 Id., at para. 88. 
8 Id., at paras. 104-108. 
9 Section 13(1) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210. 
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discriminatory. She applied the test for establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination set out in O’Malley v. Simpsons-Sears: did the challenged 
rule impose adverse differential treatment at least in part on the basis of a 
prohibited ground?10 To meet the O’Malley test, the claimant’s burden of 
proof consists of proving the following three elements on the balance of 
probabilities: (1) he or she is a member of a group identified by one or 
more prohibited grounds of discrimination; (2) he or she was subjected to 
adverse differential treatment; and (3) a prohibited ground was a factor in 
the adverse differential treatment.11 It followed that if Tawney Meiorin 
could establish that her inability to pass the aerobics test was at least in 
part related to her sex, then she would discharge her burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and the burden of 
establishing a defence or justification would then shift to the respondent. 
Applying this test, it took McLachlin J. just a few swift sentences to 
conclude that Ms. Meiorin had established that the aerobic standard had a 
differential adverse impact on women.12 The labour arbitrator had found 
that “most women are adversely affected by the high aerobic standard”. 
Therefore, McLachlin J. wrote, Ms. Meiorin “demonstrated that the 
aerobic standard is prima facie discriminatory”.13 The burden then 
shifted to the government to justify the standard. Justice McLachlin 
found that the government had not demonstrated that the rule was rea-
sonably necessary to ensuring that forest firefighters are able to work 
safely and efficiently.14 The Court ordered that Ms. Meiorin be reinstated, 
with compensation for lost wages and benefits, because her dismissal 
was based on a discriminatory standard.15  
                                                                                                             
10 Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] S.C.J. No. 74, [1985] 2 
S.C.R. 536, at 551-52 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “O’Malley”]. See also British Columbia (Superintendent 
of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] S.C.J. No. 73, [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 868 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grismer”].  
11 The O’Malley test is frequently stated in these terms. For a recent example, see Shaw v. 
Phipps, [2012] O.J. No. 2601, 289 O.A.C. 163, at para. 14 (Ont. C.A.). See also the discussion in 
Peel Law Assn. v. Pieters, [2013] O.J. No. 2695, 116 O.R. (3d) 81, at paras. 53-62 (Ont. C.A.), 
affirming the application of the test as stated in Shaw v. Phipps. 
12 In Grismer, supra, note 10, a case decided a few months after Meiorin, one sentence was 
all it took for the Court to conclude that the visually impaired claimant had established a prima facie 
case of discrimination: “Mr. Grismer established a prima facie case of discrimination under the Act 
by showing that he was denied a [driver’s] licence that was available to others, and that the denial 
was made on the basis of a physical disability.” Id., at para. 23. 
13 Meiorin, supra, note 2, at para. 69. 
14 Id., at para. 83. 
15 Id., at para. 84. 
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Law and Meiorin were unanimous rulings of the Court. Both dis-
posed of challenges to government rules that imposed adverse 
differential treatment based on prohibited grounds of discrimination. In 
Law, the Court’s entire discussion is devoted to concluding that the ad-
verse differential treatment on a prohibited ground did not amount to 
discrimination. In Meiorin, the Court quickly found that the adverse dif-
ferential treatment on a prohibited ground amounted to prima facie 
discrimination. Its discussion was focused on whether the government 
could justify the rule. The Law opinion is consumed by the problem of 
defining discrimination; the Meiorin opinion had no difficulty finding 
prima facie discrimination, and focused instead on clarifying the test for 
justification.16 In Meiorin, the Court held the government to account, 
calling on it to explain the necessity of a discriminatory rule. In Law, the 
Court did not require the government to justify the challenged rule pur-
suant to section 1 of the Charter. 
In Meiorin, McLachlin J. did not mention the elaborate human dig-
nity test the Court had put forward for determining discrimination in the 
Charter context in the Law ruling earlier in the same year. In Law, 
Iacobucci J. did not mention the less burdensome O’Malley test for es-
tablishing prima facie discrimination that operates in the statutory 
context. The two rulings simply did not speak to each other. 
In many ways the tests for discrimination expounded in the statutory 
and constitutional contexts coincide: ever since Andrews,17 the Court’s 
first ruling interpreting section 15 of the Charter, the Court has 
emphasized that section 15 and Human Rights Codes have the common 
purpose of overcoming substantive discrimination. In defining 
discrimination under the Charter, the Court has been inspired and guided 
from the outset by jurisprudence developed by Canadian human rights 
tribunals and courts when interpreting statutory prohibitions on 
discrimination in Human Rights Codes. In McIntyre J.’s discussion of 
the meaning of discrimination in Andrews, he began with a brief overview 
of the history of Canadian Human Rights Codes,18 stated that “there is 
little difficulty … in isolating an acceptable definition” from the case law 
                                                                                                             
16 Once a claimant has established prima facie discrimination, the Court held that an 
employer may justify an impugned rule by establishing that it is rationally connected to job 
performance, has been adopted in an honest and good faith belief, and is reasonably necessary in the 
sense that it is impossible to accommodate employees without undue hardship. Id., at para. 54. 
17 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”]. 
18 Id., at 172. 
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interpreting the Codes,19 and cited the O’Malley ruling for its definition 
of discrimination as adverse differential treatment on the basis of a 
prohibited ground.20 He also adopted the definitions of adverse-effects 
discrimination and systemic discrimination from O’Malley and Action 
Travail des Femmes,21 respectively,22 establishing that a substantive 
conception of discrimination, focused on effects that exacerbate the 
subordination of historically disadvantaged groups, would henceforth 
guide Canadian anti-discrimination law in both the statutory and 
constitutional realms. Furthermore, he took the position that, in general, 
“the principles which have been applied under the Human Rights Acts 
are equally applicable in considering questions of discrimination under s. 
15(1)”.23 In particular, he noted, “discrimination under s. 15(1) will be of 
the same nature and in descriptive terms will fit the concept 
of discrimination developed under the Human Rights Acts”.24 
Despite the emphasis on a harmonized approach to the definition of 
discrimination in Andrews, some passages in McIntyre J.’s opinion 
hinted that section 15 claimants might have to establish something more 
than adverse differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground of 
discrimination. That added requirement turned out to be a violation of 
human dignity according to the Law ruling, and, later, according to 
Kapp25 and Withler,26 the operation of prejudice or stereotype. The added 
requirement might seem to be a minor wrinkle on otherwise identical 
statutory and constitutional tests. Perhaps that is true on the page. But, in 
practice, judges have interpreted this added element in a manner that has 
turned it into a formidable barrier for claimants. The human dignity re-
quirement, or more recently, the requirement of proving the operation of 
prejudice or stereotype, has been the fulcrum on which many section 15 
claims have turned.  
Justice Iacobucci intimated in Law that it would be “rare” for a court 
not to find discrimination if a claimant establishes adverse differential 
                                                                                                             
19 Id., at 173. 
20 Id. 
21 Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 42, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Action Travail des Femmes”]. 
22 Andrews, supra, note 17, at 173-74. 
23 Id., at 175. 
24 Id., at 176. 
25 R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”]. 
26 Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Withler”]. 
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treatment on a prohibited ground.27 How wrong this prediction has proven 
to be. Half of the Supreme Court of Canada’s post-Law section 15 
decisions are precisely the kind that Iacobucci J. supposed would be 
“rare” — that is, cases where the Court found that adverse differential 
treatment on prohibited grounds did not amount to discrimination 
because the claimant failed to demonstrate a violation of human dignity 
or the operation of prejudice or stereotype.28 If these claims had been 
adjudicated according to the O’Malley/Meiorin allocation of burdens of 
proof, the claimants would have succeeded in demonstrating a prima 
facie case of discrimination, and the burden of justification would have 
then fallen on the government respondents. In Charter litigation, 
governments are frequently absolved by courts adjudicating section 15 
claims of any duty to explain the need for laws or policies that impose 
adverse differential treatment on the members of historically 
                                                                                                             
27 Law, supra, note 1, at para. 110. 
28 Examples from the Supreme Court’s post-Law jurisprudence include, in reverse 
chronological order: Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham, [2011] 
S.C.J. No. 37, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cunningham”] (adverse differential 
treatment of status Indians not discriminatory); Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. 
No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fraser”] (adverse differential treatment of 
agricultural workers not discriminatory); Withler, supra, note 26 (adverse differential treatment on 
the basis of age not discriminatory); Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. 
No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”] (adverse differential 
treatment on the basis of religion not discriminatory); C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and 
Family Services), [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, 309 D.L.R. (4th) 581 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C. (A.)”] 
(adverse differential treatment on the basis of age not discriminatory); Ermineskin Indian Band and 
Nation v. Canada, [2009] S.C.J. No. 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ermineskin”] 
(adverse differential treatment of Indian bands not discriminatory); Kapp, supra, note 25 (adverse 
differential treatment on the basis of race not discriminatory); Health Services and Support - 
Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 
391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”] (adverse differential treatment on the basis of sex not 
discriminatory); Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. 
No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of marital status not 
discriminatory); Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the 
basis of age not discriminatory); Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84, 
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of marital status not 
discriminatory); Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 
(S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of age not discriminatory); Lovelace v. Ontario, 
[2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of 
Aboriginal band status not discriminatory); Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration), [2000] S.C.J. No. 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on 
the basis of physical disability not discriminatory); Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric 
Institute), [1999] S.C.J. No. 31, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the 
basis of mental disability not discriminatory). 
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disadvantaged groups, or of explaining whether they considered 
alternative, less burdensome means of accomplishing their objectives. 
Ever since the strange double life of Canadian equality rights came 
to the fore in the Court’s 1999 rulings, debate has raged in the case law 
and legal scholarship about whether the constitutional definition of dis-
crimination should infiltrate the statutory realm.29 Yet the Supreme Court 
of Canada has remained curiously silent on the issue. The Court contin-
ues to cite the O’Malley test in the statutory realm30 and the Court has 
applied a more burdensome test in the constitutional realm.  
To better align its jurisprudence with section 15’s objective of pro-
moting substantive equality, in Kapp31 and Withler32 the Court reduced 
the burdens on equality rights claimants by eliminating the need to prove 
a violation of human dignity, and by eliminating the need to rely on proof 
of discriminatory treatment compared to a single, correct “mirror com-
parator group”. The Court restated the test for establishing a violation of 
section 15(1) in simpler terms than the prolix Law test: “(1) Does the law 
                                                                                                             
29 The leading case in Ontario was, until the past year, Ontario (Director, Disability 
Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne, [2010] O.J. No. 3812, 102 O.R. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Tranchemontagne”]. For reasons discussed below, Simmons J.’s Charter-inflected 
revision of the test for establishing discrimination in the statutory realm is no longer reliable after the 
Supreme Court’s rulings in Moore, infra, note 35, and Quebec v. A., infra, note 34. For excellent 
discussions of the issues and case law, see A. Wayne MacKay, “The Marriage of Human Rights 
Codes and Section 15 of the Charter in Pursuit of Equality: A Case for Greater Separation in Both 
Theory and Practice” (2013) U.N.B.L.J. (forthcoming) [hereinafter “MacKay”]; Denise Réaume, 
“Defending the Human Rights Codes from the Charter” (2012) 9 J.L.E. 67 [hereinafter “Réaume”]; 
Benjamin Oliphant, “Prima Facie Discrimination: Is Tranchemontagne Consistent with the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s Human Rights Code Jurisprudence?” (2012) 9 J.L.E. 33 [hereinafter “Oliphant”]; 
Lesli Bisgould, “Twists and Turns and Seventeen Volumes of Evidence, or How Procedural 
Developments Might Have Influenced Substantive Human Rights Law” (2012) 9 J.L.E. 5 
[hereinafter “Bisgould”]; Leslie A. Reaume, “Postcards from O’Malley: Reinvigorating Statutory 
Human Rights Jurisprudence in the Age of the Charter” [hereinafter “Reaume”] in Fay Faraday, 
Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive 
Equality Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 373-408 [hereinafter “Faraday, Denike & 
Stephenson”]; Andrea Wright, “Formulaic Comparisons: Stopping the Charter at the Statutory 
Human Rights Gate” [hereinafter “Wright”] in Faraday, Denike & Stephenson, id., at 409-41; Karen 
Schucher & Judith Keene, Statutory Human Rights and Substantive Equality – Why and How to 
Avoid the Injury of the Law Approach (Toronto: LEAF, 2007) [hereinafter “Schucher & Keene”]; 
Karen Schucher, “Human Rights Statutes as a Tool to Eliminate and Prevent Discrimination: 
Reflections on the Supreme Court of Canada’s Jurisprudence” in Sanda Rodgers & Sheila McIntyre, 
eds., The Supreme Court of Canada and Social Justice: Commitment, Retrenchment or Retreat 
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2010), at 387-422. 
30 See, e.g., New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan 
Inc., [2008] S.C.J. No. 46, [2008] 2 S.C.R 604, at para. 49 (S.C.C.). 
31 Kapp, supra, note 25. 
32 Withler, supra note 26. 
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create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground? 
(2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice 
or stereotyping?”33  
Despite these changes, the contrast between the Court’s consistent, 
confident, clear and succinct approach to the claimant’s burden in the realm 
of statutory equality rights, and its fluctuating, verbose, demanding and 
anxious approach to the claimant’s burden in the context of section 15(1) of 
the Charter, remains striking, and strikingly evident in its two most 
recent decisions dealing with equality rights. Just as Law and Meiorin 
revealed the strange double life of equality rights in 1999, Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. A.34 and Moore v. British Columbia (Education)35 
are this past year’s Jekyll and Hyde. The four opinions in Quebec v. A. 
are cumulatively as verbose and complex as Iacobucci J.’s opinion was in 
Law, while Abella J.’s opinion in Moore is as incisive and clear as 
McLachlin J.’s opinion was in Meiorin.  
Before turning to a discussion of Moore and Quebec v. A., we will 
explore several other features of the terrain on which these two rulings 
landed. The discussion above outlined the doctrinal divergence in the 
definitions of discrimination operating in the constitutional and statutory 
realms. But we should be careful not to get caught up exclusively in pars-
ing the words used in the different legal tests. The pattern of results 
reached by courts and human rights tribunals may be more important 
than the words they use to explain those results. The next section will 
take a quick glance at data on courts and human rights tribunals’ disposi-
tion of equality rights cases in the constitutional and statutory realms.36 
II. DIVERGENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY  
EQUALITY RIGHTS PRACTICE 
One useful measure of the equality rights practice of courts and hu-
man rights tribunals is the rate at which claimants succeed in establishing 
                                                                                                             
33 Kapp, supra, note 25, at para. 17; Withler, supra, note 26, at para. 30. 
34 [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 191 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec v. A.”]. 
35 [2012] S.C.J. No. 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moore”]. 
36 I do not have data on the pattern of results when claims of discrimination in violation of 
the Code or the Charter are raised before tribunals other than human rights tribunals. Since rulings 
like Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2006] S.C.J. No. 14, 
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) have dispersed responsibility for adjudicating equality rights claims 
across the legal system, the need for empirical research investigating the results reached by other 
tribunals deciding equality rights issues has taken on increased importance. 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE DOUBLE LIFE OF EQUALITY RIGHTS 269 
claims of discrimination pursuant to section 15 of the Charter and  
statutory prohibitions on discrimination, respectively. For data on out-
comes in cases alleging violations of statutory prohibitions on 
discrimination, I will focus on Ontario and British Columbia. I have fo-
cused on these two provinces because data is readily available in the 
annual reports of their human rights tribunals, and, because they cur-
rently produce a much higher volume of anti-discrimination case law 
than other Canadian jurisdictions.37  
As set out in Table 1 below, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario 
issued 274 final rulings in cases involving new applications from 2009 to 
2012. The Tribunal found discrimination in 110, or 40 per cent, of those 
decisions.  
Table 1: Number and Percentage of Human Rights Tribunal of  
Ontario Rulings Finding Violations of Statutory  
Equality Rights38 




2009-10 75 29 39% 
2010-11 104 41 39% 
2011-12 95 40 42% 
Total 274 110 40% 
The numbers of final rulings released annually by the British 
Columbia tribunal is about half of the number in Ontario; the percentage 
of cases in which claimants have succeeded in establishing 
                                                                                                             
37 B.C. and Ontario have adopted “direct access” models in their respective Human Rights 
Codes. In a direct access model, applicants alleging discrimination contrary to human rights 
legislation file their claims directly with the human rights tribunal, rather than with human rights 
commissions as was previously the case, and remains the case, in most Canadian jurisdictions. In a 
direct access model, commissions no longer have the power to dismiss applications, and all cases 
proceed to a hearing before the tribunal. The result is a significant increase in the number of rulings, 
and likewise a significant increase in the B.C. and Ontario tribunals’ contributions to equality rights 
jurisprudence.  
38 The statistics presented in this table are drawn from the annual reports of the 
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario. See Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Annual Report 2009-10, 
at 5; Social Justice Tribunals of Ontario, 2010-11 Annual Report, at 34, online: 
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/stellent/groups/public/@abcs/@www/@sjc/documents/abstract/ec16019
2.pdf>; Social Justice Tribunals of Ontario, 2011-12 Annual Report, online: 
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/stellent/groups/public/@abcs/@www/@sjc/documents/abstract/ec16226
5.pdf>. See also Andrew Pinto, Report of the Ontario Human Rights Review 2012 (November 2012), 
at 213 (“Appendix E: Tribunal Statistics”), online: http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/ 
about/pubs/human_rights/Pinto_human_rights_report_2012-ENG.pdf>.  
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discrimination is very similar. As presented in Table 2 below, from 2003 
(the year the “direct access” model came into force in that province) to 
2012, the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal has issued 439 final rulings and 
found discrimination in 181, or 41.2 per cent, of those rulings. 
Table 2: Number and Percentage of B.C. Human Rights  
Tribunal Rulings Finding Violations of Statutory  
Equality Rights39 
Year Final Rulings Discrimination Found Claimant’s 
Success Rate 
2003-04 23 15 68% 
2004-05 39 19 48% 
2005-06 53 21 40% 
2006-07 76 28 36% 
2007-08 45 15 33% 
2008-09 72 26 36% 
2009-10 48 20 42% 
2010-11 38 18 47% 
2011-12 45 19 42% 
Total 439 181 41.2% 
In a database I have compiled that includes all reported court rulings 
I have found (through comprehensive searches on Quicklaw and CanLII) 
that disposed of section 15 claims, the courts have found violations of 
section 15 in 138, or 16.4 per cent, of 841 reported cases from January 1, 
1990 to the time of writing (August 1, 2013). Unlike the stable claimants’ 
success rate before the B.C. and Ontario human rights tribunals presented 
in Tables 1 and 2, the success rate of section 15 claimants has declined 
sharply in recent years. Indeed, as indicated in Table 3 below, Charter 
equality rights claimants’ success rate dropped to 11.6 per cent of re-
ported cases in the five-year period from 2005 to 2009, and has fallen 
even further since then, to 7.2 per cent.  
                                                                                                             
39 The statistics presented in this table are drawn from the annual reports of the B.C. Human 
Rights Tribunal, online: <http://www.bchrt.bc.ca/annual_reports/index.htm>. See B.C. Human 
Rights Tribunal, Annual Report 2003-04, at 13, Annual Report 2004-05, at 16, Annual Report 2005-
06, at 14, Annual Report 2006-07, at 17, Annual Report 2007-08, at 18, Annual Report 2008-09, at 21, 
Annual Report 2009-10, at 19, online, id., Annual Report 2010-11, at 12, and Annual Report 2011-
12, at 11. 
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Table 3: Number and Percentage of Court Rulings Finding  
Violations of Constitutional Equality Rights40 





Section 15 Found 
Claimant’s 
Success Rate 
1990-1994 190 29 15.3% 
1995-1999 170 37 21.7% 
2000-2004 188 41 21.8% 
2005-2009 224 26 11.6% 
2010-201341 69 5 7.2% 
Total 841 138 16.4% 
The small number of court rulings finding violations of Charter 
equality rights over the course of the last decade is striking. As Taufiq 
Hashmani and I observed in 2010, “to say that Charter equality rights are 
not in judicial vogue is an understatement”.42 Judges have not shown any 
greater enthusiasm for Charter equality rights since then. 
In light of the lack of recent success achieved by section 15 claim-
ants, and the significant costs involved in launching section 15 court 
challenges, it is not surprising that the number of Charter equality claims 
brought to the courts annually is declining precipitously. The number of 
reported rulings by courts disposing of section 15 claims hovered around 
40 annually from 1990 to 2009. Since then the number of section 15 rul-
ings issued by the courts has dropped by more than half. In the three-year 
period from 2010 to 2012, the courts issued final rulings in 47 section 15 
cases, an average of 16 annually. 
The B.C. and Ontario human rights tribunals are issuing many more 
final rulings on statutory equality rights than Canadian courts are issuing 
rulings on constitutional equality rights, and are upholding statutory 
equality rights claims at more than five times the current rate that the 
                                                                                                             
40 The data presented in this table is drawn from the author’s database of all reported court 
rulings finding a s. 15 claim to be established or not established. In cases where a s.15 claim is 
raised, but not decided by a court, it is not included in the database. When a s. 15 case is appealed, 
only the final appellate disposition of a s. 15 claim is included in the database. 
41 This number includes rulings reported as of August 1, 2013. 
42 Bruce Ryder & Taufiq Hashmani, “Managing Charter Equality Rights: The Supreme 
Court of Canada’s Disposition of Leave to Appeal Applications in Section 15 Cases, 1989-2010” 
(2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 505, at 537 [hereinafter “Ryder & Hashmani”]. 
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courts are finding unjustified violations of Charter equality rights.43 Be-
cause of the small number of court rulings on section 15 of the Charter, 
and the higher volume of rulings being issued by human rights tribunals 
(led by Ontario and B.C.), the decisions of human rights tribunals inter-
preting statutory prohibitions on discrimination (and by courts on appeal 
or judicial review) are currently exerting the primary influence on the 
development of anti-discrimination law as a whole. At the tribunal level 
in Ontario and B.C., the influence consists of a relatively evenly bal-
anced mix of decisions in favour of claimants and respondents (whether 
that remains true in the courts on appeal or judicial review is a question 
that deserves investigation). Court rulings interpreting section 15 of the 
Charter, on the other hand, are relatively modest in number and the vast 
majority — over 90 per cent in the last three years — find in favour of 
respondents. The numbers raise a concern that a one-sided Charter law 
and practice might be placing significant barriers in the way of section 15 
claims, and may be acting as a brake on the relatively more balanced tri-
bunal jurisprudence. The high cost of putting together the evidence and 
legal arguments necessary to support a compelling constitutional equality 
rights claim, and the cancellation of the Court Challenges Program in 
2006, are no doubt factors that help explain the small numbers of recent 
section 15 case law. 
A word of caution is in order. The data presented above provides us 
with a useful glimpse into the volume and patterns of decision-making in 
litigation involving statutory equality rights before two provinces’ human 
rights tribunals and constitutional equality rights in the courts, respec-
tively. It would be a mistake to use this data to support the conclusion 
that claims of discrimination have a much higher chance of success in the 
statutory human rights system than under the Charter. This may be the 
case, and it may be the general impression left with potential litigants 
and their legal counsel surveying the track record of courts and tribunals 
adjudicating equality rights. However, we cannot draw that conclusion 
based solely on the disparity in the rates that human rights tribunals and 
courts have upheld allegations of discrimination in their final rulings. 
                                                                                                             
43 The pattern of results in human rights tribunal rulings has been presented here for only 
two jurisdictions. Every Canadian jurisdiction has human rights legislation prohibiting 
discrimination. Further research is needed to provide a fuller national picture of the results of human 
rights tribunal adjudication across the country. As noted, the direct access models in force in B.C. 
and Ontario give rise to a high volume of tribunal rulings. The number of human rights tribunal 
rulings in other Canadian jurisdictions is much smaller, particularly in the less populous provinces. 
Further research could explore whether the success rate of claimants varies between jurisdictions.  
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The data I have presented is restricted to claims that have proceeded to a 
tribunal hearing under the Human Rights Codes and to a court ruling on 
section 15 of the Charter, respectively. Because of the procedural, evi-
dentiary and substantive differences between the two bodies of anti-
discrimination law, comparing equality rights claimants’ success rates 
in final tribunal rulings and section 15 court rulings is like comparing 
apples and oranges.  
To take one difference, claims that proceed to a hearing and a final 
ruling by a human rights tribunal are focused exclusively on establishing 
discrimination and must have at least some merit, otherwise they would 
have been dismissed summarily at an earlier stage of the proceedings. In 
contrast, many section 15 claims raised in court are put forward as alter-
natives to the principal legal arguments, often by litigants clutching at 
legal straws (for example, claimants facing deportation in immigration 
proceedings) without adequate evidence or legal argument. Moreover, 
the numbers presented in Table 3 include all court rulings dismissing 
section 15 claims (whether on motions or in final rulings), while the 
numbers presented in Tables 1 and 2 do not include summary dismissal 
rulings by the B.C. and Ontario human rights tribunals in the statutory 
human rights context. We should not be surprised, then, that the data I 
have presented shows that equality rights claimants have a much higher 
success rate in final rulings by human rights tribunals than when they 
allege violations of section 15 of the Charter in court. We need to con-
duct more thorough investigation before drawing conclusions about 
claimants’ comparative success rates in the statutory and constitutional 
realms. To enable us to draw such conclusions, ideally future empirical 
research will examine all equality rights claims entering each system and 
their ultimate disposition at various stages of each process.  
The plummeting number and success rate of section 15 claims 
depicted in Table 3 is cause for concern in a society still riven by deep 
structural inequalities on the basis of sex, race, ability and other 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. The data provides strong support to 
the argument made by some critical socio-legal scholars that many forms 
of inequality are beyond the reach of constitutional rights discourse and 
litigation.44 We have to be careful not to burden section 15 litigation with 
unrealistic expectations: section 15 promises much, but has delivered 
little, at least in direct litigation outcomes in the past decade. In the 
                                                                                                             
44 See, e.g., Harry Arthurs & Brent Arnold, “Does the Charter Matter?” (2005) 11 Rev. 
Const. Studies 37. 
274 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
current political and legal environment, even when the potential impacts 
of section 15 claims are modest, and even when claims are supported by 
strong legal arguments and a strong evidentiary record, the odds of 
success in court are long. Claimants who are successful in challenges to 
laws in lower courts have to be prepared for a long battle and potential 
reversal on appeal. Consider, for example, that Quebec v. A. is the 10th 
section 15 ruling in a row from the Supreme Court of Canada that found 
for the respondent (that is, that rejected the claimant’s allegation that the 
government unjustifiably violated his or her equality rights).45 In three of 
those 10 rulings,46 the Court overturned appeal court rulings finding an 
unjustified violation of section 15. Meanwhile, the Court has denied 
leave to appeal to a number of cases where important section 15 claims 
were rejected by courts of appeal.47 As Taufiq Hashmani and I have 
found, respondents in section 15 cases are far more likely than claimants 
to be granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, and far 
more likely to be successful on appeal.48 When the Court has granted 
leave to appeal in section 15 cases in recent years, it has affirmed its 
commitment to interpreting section 15 in accordance with the objective 
of promoting substantive equality and then has invariably proceeded to 
find allegations of unjustified infringements of section 15 unfounded.49 
The disparity between the Court’s stated commitment to substantive 
equality and its deeds is disconcerting. 
It may be that, at least in some jurisdictions, equality rights claimants 
are more likely to receive sympathetic hearings from human rights tribu-
nals than they are from the courts because of the human rights expertise 
of tribunal members, the tribunals’ specialized institutional mandate and 
legal culture, and the lower burdens placed on claimants by human rights 
tribunals compared to the courts in Charter cases. Whether or not this is 
                                                                                                             
45 Quebec v. A., supra, note 34; Cunningham, supra, note 28; Fraser, supra, note 28; 
Withler, supra, note 26; Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 28; C. (A.), supra, note 28; Ermineskin, 
supra, note 28; Kapp, supra, note 25; Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 
(S.C.C.); and Health Services, supra, note 28. 
46 Quebec v. A., id.; Cunningham, id.; Hutterian Brethren, id. 
47 See the cases discussed in Ryder & Hashmani, supra, note 42, at 528-30. One of the most 
recent examples is Pratten v. British Columbia, [2012] B.C.J. No. 2460, 357 D.L.R. (4th) 660 
(B.C.C.A.) (dismissing a challenge to the provisions of the B.C. Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 5 that 
give no rights to information about their biological fathers to persons conceived through donor 
insemination), application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, May 30, 2013. 
48 Id., at 525-32. 
49 Id., at 533. 
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true, an impression to that effect has been created by the pattern of deci-
sion-making in final rulings described above.  
As a result, some equality rights claimants are voting with their feet, 
eschewing the Charter, and filing claims with human rights tribunals in-
stead. Human rights tribunals are increasingly being asked to consider 
claims that aim to transform government laws and policies of general 
application — claims, like Moore, that look and feel like traditional 
Charter challenges. These claims are possible under Human Rights 
Codes because their prohibitions on discrimination in services extend to 
much of what government does. Claire Mummé has traced the expansion 
since the 1980s of the definition of what counts as a service, resulting in 
a huge area of overlap in the application of the Charter and statutory 
Human Rights Codes.50 As Mummé notes, this growing area of overlap 
has precipitated a debate on whether the tests for establishing discrimina-
tion in the statutory and constitutional realms ought to merge. If courts 
and tribunals are essentially dealing with the same issues, the argument 
goes, then the strange double life of Canadian equality rights should 
come to an end. The test for determining whether discrimination has 
been established should be the same in both realms.  
III. TOWARDS A COMMON TEST FOR ESTABLISHING  
DISCRIMINATION 
1. Should the Test for Discrimination Differ in the Statutory and 
Constitutional Contexts? Three Approaches  
While discussions about the relationship between the statutory and 
constitutional definitions of discrimination are as old as section 15 itself, 
they took on added urgency after 1999, when the Law and Meiorin rul-
ings set the jurisprudence in the two realms on separate paths. Three 
approaches have dominated debates on the issue: one advocates a har-
monized approach that applies the Charter test in all equality rights 
litigation; a second seeks to maintain distinct tests in the statutory and 
constitutional contexts; and a third supports a harmonized approach that 
applies the O’Malley test in all equality rights litigation.  
Respondents’ counsel have pushed hard for the first approach, argu-
ing that there are no principled reasons for taking different approaches to 
                                                                                                             
50 Claire Mummé, “At the Crossroads in Discrimination Law: How the Human Rights 
Codes Overtook the Charter in Canadian Government Services Cases” (2012) 9 J.L. & Equality 103. 
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the definition of discrimination in the statutory and constitutional realms. 
Given the common underlying principles and objectives that have shaped 
section 15 of the Charter and human rights codes, the case for a uniform 
test of discrimination is a powerful one, as the Court has recognized ever 
since Andrews. As more challenges to government laws and policies are 
initiated before tribunals rather than courts, governments have urged that 
the section 15 test, as articulated in Law, and later as articulated in Kapp, 
should migrate with them. Claire Mummé has succinctly described the 
impetus behind this line of argument: 
The expanding reach of human rights statutes suggests that its 
adjudicators now rival the superior courts as sites for public law 
adjudication. … it is perhaps also exactly for this reason that the door 
has opened to the use of constitutional jurisprudence in the statutory 
framework and that judicial decision makers have been receptive to 
claims of merger between these two instruments. Put simply, … a new 
unease has emerged with using an administrative tribunal to review 
legislative and executive decisions under a less deferential standard 
than is brought to the same questions under the Charter.51 
Despite the energy and skill government lawyers (and other respon-
dents’ counsel) have put into advancing this position, they have had 
limited success. The problem is that, even if we accept the strong argu-
ments they have presented for conceptual unity, they have not been able 
to make a persuasive case for why the more burdensome Charter test, 
rather than the O’Malley test, should be the one that prevails. The test 
that should be adopted is the one that holds the most promise for advanc-
ing the underlying purpose of Canadian anti-discrimination law, the 
promotion of substantive equality. The Supreme Court has recognized, 
beginning in Kapp, that the Charter definition of discrimination has 
proven overly burdensome to claimants and has hindered the pursuit of 
substantive equality. To apply the Charter test to the statutory realm, 
when the Court has embarked on an attempt to lower the burdens it im-
poses, would be to compound the problem the Court is trying to solve. 
While the problems with the Charter test are well known and widely ac-
cepted, nobody has made a persuasive case that the O’Malley/Meiorin 
tests and allocations of burdens are operating unfairly for applicants or 
respondents in the adjudication of statutory claims. 
                                                                                                             
51 Id., at 137. 
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The second approach seeks to maintain different tests for establish-
ing discrimination in the constitutional and statutory contexts. A number 
of scholars have argued in favour of this position.52 For these scholars, 
the strange double life of Canadian equality rights is not so strange after 
all; it is explained by the different features, legal status and mechanisms 
of enforcement of Human Rights Codes and the Charter. The primary 
goal of this body of scholarship has been to defend the lower burden im-
posed on statutory equality rights claimants by the O’Malley test 
compared to the burdens imposed on section 15 claimants by the Law 
test (or later, the Kapp test).  
The O’Malley test is defended in this literature as best suited to pro-
moting the substantive equality objective of Human Rights Codes: it 
maintains access to justice by not imposing unrealistic or costly burdens 
on claimants, and it allocates burdens in accordance with the knowledge 
and information-gathering capacities of the parties. Because this scholar-
ship is focused on preventing the Charter test from colonizing the 
statutory realm, it has devoted less attention, and sometimes none at all, 
to considering whether there is a persuasive rationale for placing higher 
burdens on equality rights claimants who make constitutional as opposed 
to statutory claims. As the titles of articles by Andrea Wright and Denise 
Réaume express it, the goal of this literature has been to “stop the Charter 
at the human rights gate”, or “to defend human rights codes from the 
Charter”.53 This defensive scholarship has not argued for a reconsidera-
tion of the Charter test itself. 
The problem with the body of scholarship that supports divergent 
tests for discrimination in the statutory and constitutional realms is that 
the authors’ arguments against importing the more burdensome Law or 
Kapp tests into the statutory jurisprudence are equally persuasive reasons 
for not applying those tests in the constitutional context in the first place. 
Access to justice concerns are equally if not more profound in the Char-
ter context, given the high costs involved in litigation against the 
government in court. It makes as much as sense to allocate burdens in 
accordance with the parties’ knowledge and access to relevant facts in the 
Charter context as it does under Human Rights Codes. While supporters 
of divergent approaches to discrimination point to differences in the legal 
                                                                                                             
52 See MacKay, supra, note 29; Réaume, supra, note 29; Oliphant, supra, note 29; 
Bisgould, supra, note 29; Reaume, supra, note 29; Wright, supra, note 29; Schucher & Keene, 
supra, note 29. 
53 Wright, id.; Réaume, id.  
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status, design and reach of Human Rights Codes and section 15, it is not 
clear why any of those differences should impose higher burdens on 
claimants seeking to demonstrate discrimination in constitutional cases. 
Section 1 affords all of the flexibility courts need in balancing the protec-
tion of Charter rights and freedoms with the achievement of pressing 
government objectives. 
A third perspective accepts the desirability of adopting a common 
test for establishing discrimination in both the statutory and constitu-
tional spheres, but sees the O’Malley test, as subsequently refined and 
developed in the case law interpreting human rights legislation, rather 
than the tests put forward in the section 15 jurisprudence, as the norma-
tive position around which anti-discrimination law should coalesce. 
Many scholars have argued that a major flaw of the courts’ section 15 
jurisprudence is that it imports issues into the claimant’s burden of estab-
lishing discrimination that ought to be addressed as part of the 
government’s burden of justification under section 1.54 The solution is to 
require equality rights claimants to prove differential treatment on the 
basis of a prohibited ground that imposes disadvantage in a prima facie 
sense, at which point the burden shifts to the government to attempt to 
justify the challenged law or policy pursuant to section 1.55 This ap-
proach is essentially identical to the O’Malley/Meiorin tests and the 
division of evidentiary burdens that operates in the statutory realm.  
A potential danger with the third approach is that it casts section 15’s 
net too broadly in a manner that overshoots its substantive equality pur-
pose. Writing in 2002, Arbour J. cautioned that a broad interpretation of 
section 15 risked diluting the power of equality rights, and producing a 
section 1 test that lacked rigour: 
                                                                                                             
54 See, e.g., Beverley Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” (2000) 11 Const. 
Forum 65, at 72; Christopher Bredt & Adam Dodek, ”Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New 
Paradigm for Section 15” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 33, at 54 [hereinafter “Bredt & Dodek”]; Donna 
Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299, at 306; 
Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 
627; Caroline Hodes, “Dignity and the Conditions of Truth: What Equality Needs from Law” (2007) 
19 C.J.W.L. 273, at 282; Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough, ON: 
Carswell, 2007), student ed., at 1154-55; Jennifer Koshan & Jonettte Watson Hamilton, 
“Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality After Withler” (2011-2012) 16 Rev. Const. Studies 31, 
at 58; MacKay, supra, note 29; Sheila McIntyre, “Deference and Dominance: Equality Without 
Substance” in Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers, eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2006), at 95; 
Paul-Erik Veel, “A New Direction in the Interpretation of Section 15(1)? A Case Comment on 
R. v. Kapp” (2008) 6:1 J.L. & Equality 33. 
55 See, e.g., Bredt & Dodek, id., at 54. 
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We must be careful, in our understandable eagerness to extend equality 
rights as widely as possible, to avoid stripping those rights of any 
meaningful content. Lack of care can only result in the creation of an 
equality guarantee that is far-reaching but wafer-thin, an expansive but 
insubstantial shield with which to fend off state incursions on our 
dignity and freedom.56 
One answer to this concern is to insist that the O’Malley definition of 
discrimination operate in both statutory and constitutional contexts in a 
manner that is attentive to the substantive equality purpose of Canadian 
anti-discrimination law. The burdens imposed by the O’Malley test are 
appropriate for the adjudication of claims by members of historically 
disadvantaged groups, as the government should have to justify the im-
position of further disadvantage on those groups on the basis of prohib-
ited grounds of discrimination. When equality rights claims are brought 
by members of relatively advantaged groups, we can fairly ask for 
evidence of substantive discrimination beyond the imposition of adverse 
differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground. 
In any case, Arbour J.’s concern that equality rights not be defined 
too broadly does not resonate in the current context. The recent judicial 
record gives rise to the opposite concern. As we have seen, fewer and 
fewer section 15 claims are litigated, and, when they are, fewer and 
fewer litigants succeed in putting governments to the test of justification. 
A more expansive approach to section 15 is necessary to rescue it from 
oblivion. 
The debate on whether the tests for discrimination in the statutory 
and constitutional realms should be harmonized was an important part of 
the submissions made to the Court in Moore. Much of the factum of 
intervener West Coast LEAF, for example, was devoted to defending the 
statutory realm from being infiltrated by the more burdensome Charter 
test of discrimination (the second approach described above).57 Another 
intervener, the Canadian Constitution Foundation (“CCF”), succinctly 
presented the case for harmonizing the divergent definitions of  
                                                                                                             
56 Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, at para. 86 (S.C.C.). See 
also the concerns about an understanding of equality rights that is too broad and too shallow 
expressed by Denise Réaume in “The Relevance of Relevance to Equality Rights” (2006) 31 
Queen’s L.J. 696. 
57 Factum of the Intervener West Coast Women’s Legal and Education Action Fund, online: 
<http://www.westcoastleaf.org/userfiles/file/Intervener%20West%20Coast%20LEAF%20Factum.pdf>, 
at paras. 10-26. 
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discrimination by making the Charter test applicable in the statutory 
realm (the first approach described above).58  
In a telling moment during oral argument in Moore, counsel for the 
CCF, Ranjan Agarwal, submitted that “the elephant in the room in this 
case” is the relationship between the constitutional and statutory tests for 
discrimination. He submitted that “this Court in its reasons should find 
that the test for discrimination under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
is the same as the test for discrimination under the Human Rights 
Code”.59 To which Abella J. interjected: “we’ve been saying that since 
Andrews”. Mr. Agarwal replied that the situation was not so clear to 
lower courts and tribunals. In forceful submissions, he urged the Court to 
take the opportunity in its reasons in Moore to clarify the law by 
expressly adopting a harmonized approach. Justice Abella remained 
puzzled by these submissions, insisting that “there is no different test for 
what discrimination means”.60 Mr. Agarwal, in other words, urged the 
Court to move from the second to the first approach described above. 
Justice Abella, in her comments, made it clear she is no supporter of the 
strange double life of Canadian equality rights. Justice Abella believes 
the law does and should embody a harmonized approach. As it turns out, 
the harmonized approach she supports is just not the one Mr. Agarwal 
was urging upon her. She favours the third approach described above. 
Her opinions in Moore and Quebec v. A., as we shall see in the next 
section, affirmed the operation of the O’Malley test for determining 
discrimination in the statutory context, and moved the constitutional test 
closer to it. 
2. Moore and Quebec v. A.: Convergence in the Tests for  
Establishing Discrimination 
At issue in Moore was whether a school district and the B.C. Minis-
try of Education had discriminated against a student with a severe 
learning disability, Jeffrey Moore, by failing to provide him with the in-
tensive remedial instruction he needed for his dyslexia in his early school 
                                                                                                             
58 Factum of the Intervener Canadian Constitution Foundation, online: <http://www. 
canadianconstitutionfoundation.ca/files/31/Factum%20of%20the%20Intervener%20-%20Moore.pdf>, 
at paras. 5-9. 
59 See the segment of the webcast of the oral argument in Moore v. British Columbia 
beginning at 295:30, available at the Supreme Court of Canada website, online: <http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/info/webcast-webdiffusion-eng.aspx?cas=34040>. 
60 Id., at 303:00. 
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years. Before the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal, Mr. Moore argued that 
the O’Malley test should be followed to determine whether the school 
district and the province had discriminated against him.61 The govern-
ment respondents argued that the Law “human dignity” test used to 
interpret section 15 of the Charter at the time should apply because the 
case “involved government action and allegations of systemic discrimi-
nation in the context of broad public policy issues in education”.62 As 
mentioned above, this is a common strategy: governments and other re-
spondents have been trying to import the more burdensome 
constitutional test for discrimination into the statutory realm for some 
time. 
Tribunal Chair Heather MacNaughton acknowledged the existence of 
uncertainty about whether the constitutional test articulated in Law ap-
plied in the statutory realm. She therefore decided to apply both the 
O’Malley and the Law tests, and concluded that a prima facie case of 
discrimination had been established regardless of the test applied.63 She 
went on to find that the respondents had not met their burden of justify-
ing the denial of intensive remedial instruction to Mr. Moore. 
On judicial review, uncertainty about the applicable legal test contin-
ued. At the B.C. Superior Court, the Tribunal decision was reversed. 
Relying heavily on Charter rulings such as Auton,64 Dillon J. found that 
“[t]he Tribunal’s failure to identify and then to compare the appropriate 
comparator group [other special education students] crucially tainted the 
whole of the discrimination analysis”.65 On appeal to the B.C. Court of 
Appeal, Mr. Moore’s appeal was dismissed.66 Citing the Charter case law 
on mirror comparator groups (since repudiated by Withler),67 the major-
ity opinion of Low J.A. agreed with Dillon J. that it was necessary for the 
analysis to be shaped by an appropriate comparator group. In this case, 
the appropriate comparator group was “special needs students other than 
                                                                                                             
61 Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 580, 54 
C.H.R.R. D/245, at para. 719 (B.C.H.R.T.). 
62 Id., at para. 722. 
63 Id., at para. 740. 
64 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. 
No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.). 
65 British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore, [2008] B.C.J. No. 348, 81 B.C.L.R. 
(4th) 107, at para. 147 (B.C.S.C.).  
66 British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2097, 326 D.L.R. 
(4th) 77 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Moore CA”]. 
67 Supra, note 26. 
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those with severe learning disabilities”.68 The evidence did not establish 
differential treatment compared to this group. Justice Low concluded: 
Jeffrey Moore and other severely learning disabled students were given 
the same opportunity to receive a general education as was given to all 
other students. To compare these students with the general student 
population is to invite an enquiry into general education policy and its 
application.69 
Justice Rowles dissented. Like the Tribunal, she acknowledged the 
existence of debate about the applicability of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada’s section 15 jurisprudence to claims of discrimination brought under 
human rights statutes.70 After canvassing the case law and competing 
views, she concluded that “the proper approach to claims of discrimina-
tion under the Code is the traditional framework set out in O’Malley and 
subsequently developed by statutory human rights jurisprudence”.71 She 
noted that after the abandonment of the “human dignity” test in Kapp, 
“the gap between the Charter approach to discrimination and the statu-
tory human rights approach is arguably narrowing once again”.72 She 
agreed with the Tribunal’s finding of prima facie discrimination, and 
concluded that the school district “has not proven that it accommodated 
Jeffrey and other severely learning disabled students to the point of un-
due hardship”.73 
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Moore’s appeal was substan-
tially allowed.74 Justice Abella wrote a powerful unanimous opinion on 
behalf of the Court restoring the Tribunal’s finding that the school district 
had discriminated against Mr. Moore. She strongly rejected the compara-
tor group analysis applied by the B.C. courts. In her words, 
Comparing Jeffrey only with other special needs students would mean 
that the District could cut all special needs programs and yet be 
immune from a claim of discrimination. It is not a question of who else 
is or is not experiencing similar barriers. This formalism was one of the 
potential dangers of comparator groups identified in Withler ...75 
                                                                                                             
68 Moore CA, supra, note 66, at para. 182. 
69 Id., at para. 183. 
70 Id., at para. 37. 
71 Id., at para. 51. 
72 Id., at para. 53. 
73 Id., at para. 158. 
74 Moore, supra, note 35. 
75 Id., at para. 30 (emphasis in original). 
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Instead, Abella J. characterized adequate special education services 
as “the ramp that provides access to the statutory commitment to educa-
tion made to all children in British Columbia”.76 The key question, she 
wrote, is whether the failure to provide Mr. Moore with intensive reme-
diation “was … an unjustified denial of meaningful access to the general 
education to which students in British Columbia are entitled and, as a 
result, discrimination”.77 
In answering this question, Abella J. stated that the Tribunal had 
properly applied the O’Malley/Meiorin test: 
As the Tribunal properly recognized, to demonstrate prima facie discri
mination, complainants are required to show that they have a 
characteristic protected from discrimination under the Code; that they 
experienced an adverse impact with respect to the service; and that the 
protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact. Once 
a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the 
respondent to justify the conduct or practice, within the framework of 
the exemptions available under human rights statutes. If it cannot be 
justified, discrimination will be found to occur.78 
Justice Abella made no mention of the fact that the Tribunal had also 
applied the Law test. In fact, she made no reference at all to the Law or 
the Kapp tests in her reasons. The words “human dignity”, “prejudice” or 
“stereotype” — words that have so bedevilled the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s constitutional equality rights jurisprudence — are nowhere to 
be found in Abella J.’s opinion in Moore. It would have been better if she 
had stated explicitly that the additional requirement that constitutional 
equality rights claimants have had to establish — a violation of human 
dignity (from 1999 to 2008 in the Law era), or the perpetuation of disad-
vantage through the operation of prejudice or stereotyping (2008 to 2013 
in the Kapp era) — should not be part of the claimant’s burden in the 
statutory realm. But such an additional burden has never been part of the 
Court’s statutory equality rights jurisprudence,79 so Abella J. may have 
considered an affirmative statement along those lines unnecessary, even 
though she had been urged to address the issue in the submissions de-
scribed above. In any case, a few months later, as we shall see in our 
discussion of Quebec v. A. below, Abella J. held that proof of the  
                                                                                                             
76 Id., at para. 5. 
77 Id., at para. 32. 
78 Id., at para. 33. 
79 See the review of the jurisprudence in Oliphant, supra, note 29. 
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operation of prejudice or stereotyping is no longer a requirement that 
must be met to establish violations of section 15 of the Charter.  
Applying the O’Malley test, Abella J. had no difficulty finding that 
Mr. Moore had a disability (dyslexia), and that the adverse impact he 
endured was related to his disability.80 She went on to conclude that he 
was denied meaningful access to a service (the general education avail-
able to the public) on the basis of his disability, because the remediation 
provided by the school district “was far from adequate to give Jeffrey the 
education to which he was entitled”.81  
Turning to the issue of justification, the question was whether the 
school district had demonstrated that there were no reasonable or 
practical alternatives to the denial of intensive remediation services to 
Mr. Moore in light of the budgetary crisis it faced.82 Justice Abella 
concluded that the school district had not met its burden, as special needs 
programs were cut disproportionately and not accorded the constitutional 
priority they deserved.83 Moreover, “the District undertook no 
assessment, financial or otherwise, of what alternatives were or could be 
reasonably available to accommodate special needs students if the 
Diagnostic Centre were closed”.84 This failure undermined the school 
district’s argument that budgetary constraints prevented it from providing 
meaningful access to education to Mr. Moore: “[i]n order to decide that it 
had no other choice, it had at least to consider what those other choices 
were”.85  
The finding of discrimination against the District was thus confirmed 
unanimously by the Supreme Court of Canada. Justice Abella upheld the 
Tribunal’s award of monetary damages to the Moores for the costs of the 
private special education they had to incur and for the injury to Jeffrey’s 
“dignity, feelings and self-respect”.86 She reversed the Tribunal’s sys-
temic orders directed at the school district and the provincial 
government, finding them too remotely related to the finding of dis-
crimination against Jeffrey.87 
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The Moore ruling is the most powerful ruling on equality rights from 
the Court since its rulings in the late 1990s in Eldridge88 and Vriend.89 
Justice Abella’s opinion is eloquent, succinct and compelling. The Court 
was united around her application of settled jurisprudence. As a result, 
the Court in Moore was able to provide clear guidance to school boards 
regarding their obligations to prioritize available resources to promote 
equal access to educational services for persons with disabilities, just as 
the Eldridge ruling had clarified hospitals’ obligations to provide equal 
access to public health care services to the hearing impaired. Moreover, 
Abella J.’s restatement and application of the O’Malley test for 
discrimination, carefully omitting any reference to the leading cases 
setting out the test for discrimination in the Charter context, and carefully 
omitting the terminology (human dignity, prejudice, stereotype) that has 
imposed added burdens on equality rights claimants in section 15 cases, 
provides a clear indication to lower courts that they should do the same. 
Lower courts and tribunals no longer need to worry about whether to 
incorporate proof of a violation of “human dignity” or “the perpetuation 
of disadvantage through the operation of prejudice or stereotyping” into 
the statutory test for discrimination. To the extent that earlier lower court 
or tribunal rulings did incorporate this added burden into the statutory 
test for discrimination, such as the Ontario Court of Appeal ruling in 
Tranchemontagne,90 they are no longer reliable statements of the law in 
light of the Court’s rulings in Moore and Quebec v. A. 
The Court’s other recent equality rights ruling in the case of Quebec 
v. A.91 is more complicated and its implications less clear, because the 
judges were closely divided and wrote four separate opinions. At issue 
were provisions of the Quebec Civil Code92 that accord rights to spousal 
support, the family residence, the family patrimony, the compensatory 
allowance and the partnership of acquests only to married spouses or to 
persons in civil unions. The claimant Ms. A had lived with Mr. B for 
seven years in a conjugal relationship. They had three children together. 
She wanted to marry, but he refused. When they separated, Ms. A found 
herself without access to the spousal support and property rights in the 
                                                                                                             
88 Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
624 (S.C.C.). 
89 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.). 
90 Supra, note 29. 
91 Supra, note 34. 
92 Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64. 
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Civil Code. She brought a challenge to the provisions of the Civil Code 
on constitutional grounds.  
Was it discrimination on the basis of marital status, and thus an in-
fringement of section 15(1) of the Charter, for the Quebec National 
Assembly to exclude de facto spouses (that is, unmarried couples living 
together in conjugal relationships) from these statutory rights? If so, 
could the government justify the infringement pursuant to section 1 of 
the Charter?  
If we were to apply the O’Malley test from the statutory realm for 
determining violations of section 15(1), the claimant would have to es-
tablish that the challenged provisions imposed adverse differential 
impact on the basis of the prohibited ground of marital status (which has 
been recognized by the Court as analogous to the other grounds listed in 
section 15). This was the straightforward and well-established approach 
around which the Court united in Moore. Then the burden could quickly 
shift to the government to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination by 
establishing a justification in accordance with section 1 of the Charter.  
But no such luck. Quebec v. A. was a constitutional equality rights 
case. A set of anxieties not present in the statutory jurisprudence appar-
ently were summoned forth. The Court in Quebec v. A. produced a 
lengthy and complicated ruling featuring four separate opinions that cu-
mulatively consumed 450 paragraphs. The opinions resulted in two 
closely divided rulings on the section 15(1) and section 1 issues, respec-
tively, that revealed a starkly gendered division among the judges. 
First, a 5-4 majority, featuring a lead opinion written by Abella J., 
and two separate concurring opinions written by Deschamps J. (joined by 
Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.) and the Chief Justice, found that the im-
pugned provisions of the Civil Code discriminated on the basis of marital 
status and thus infringed section 15(1) of the Charter. In other words, the 
four women on the Court, joined by Cromwell J., found the denial of 
rights to de facto spouses to be discriminatory. The four other men on the 
Court dissented in an opinion written by LeBel J. (Fish, Rothstein and 
Moldaver JJ. concurring). Justice LeBel’s dissent is remarkable both for 
its length (282 paragraphs) and for its conclusion that none of the chal-
lenged provisions infringe section 15(1) because they do not express or 
perpetuate prejudice or stereotyping. Justice LeBel’s dissent should stand 
as a reminder why members of disadvantaged groups should be relieved 
of the burden of proving that the disadvantage imposed on them by the 
government operated through prejudice or stereotyping.  
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Second, a differently constituted 5-4 majority affirmed the validity of 
the challenged provisions. The majority in the result consisted of LeBel J.’s 
opinion for four members of the Court that the impugned provisions of 
the Civil Code did not infringe section 15(1) and the Chief Justice’s con-
clusion that the infringement of section 15(1) could be justified pursuant 
to section 1, because “the Quebec law falls within a range of reasonable 
alternatives for maximizing choice and autonomy in the matter of family 
assets and support”.93 In their dissenting opinions on the section 1 issues, 
Abella J. would have found none of the impugned provisions to be justi-
fied, and Deschamps J. (Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. concurring) 
would have found them all to be justified apart from the provision deal-
ing with spousal support rights. 
The Court’s opinions in Quebec v. A. raise a multitude of interesting 
questions. Here, I will focus only on what members of the Court had to 
say about the approach to the claimant’s burden in establishing an in-
fringement of section 15(1). As noted above, in Kapp the Court 
committed to relieving the undue burdens its previous jurisprudence had 
placed on claimants asserting violations of their constitutional equality 
rights. It did so by eliminating the need to prove a violation of human 
dignity. The Court continued the project of reducing the burdens placed 
on section 15(1) claimants in Withler by eliminating the need to structure 
the discrimination analysis around a single “mirror comparator group”. 
The test put forward by the majority in Quebec v. A. continues the post-
Kapp trajectory of alleviating the burdens on section 15(1) claimants, 
and calling on the government to justify, pursuant to section 1 of the 
Charter, laws or policies that have the effect of imposing adverse differ-
ential treatment on the basis of prohibited grounds on members of 
historically disadvantaged groups.  
As discussed above, prior to the Court’s ruling in Quebec v. A., the 
test for determining violations of section 15(1) was set out in Kapp and 
Withler as follows: “(1) Does the law create a distinction based on an 
enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction create a disad-
vantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?”94 In her opinion for 
the majority on section 15(1), Abella J. reformulated this test in several 
important ways.  
First, Justice Abella stated that, contrary to the impression left in Kapp 
and Withler, the claimant is not required to prove that the challenged 
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law perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping.95 Rather, “[p]rejudice and 
stereotyping are two of the indicia that may help answer” whether the 
challenged law violates substantive equality; “they are not discrete 
elements of the test which the claimant is obliged to demonstrate”.96 
Second, she resolved an ambiguity in the earlier case law about the 
meaning of the word “prejudice”. Sometimes, the Court appeared to use 
the word “prejudice” as a synonym for “disadvantage” (as in, “does the 
challenged law impose prejudice or disadvantage on the claimant”?). On 
other occasions, the Court appeared to use prejudice as meaning a dis-
criminatory bad attitude. In Quebec v. A., Abella J. clearly opted for the 
latter meaning. She defined prejudice as follows: 
Prejudice is the holding of pejorative attitudes based on strongly held 
views about the appropriate capacities or limits of individuals or the 
groups of which they are a member. Stereotyping, like prejudice, is a 
disadvantaging attitude, but one that attributes characteristics to 
members of a group regardless of their actual capacities. Attitudes of 
prejudice and stereotyping can undoubtedly lead to discriminatory 
conduct, and discriminatory conduct in turn can reinforce these 
negative attitudes …97 
While the proof that differential treatment on a prohibited ground 
perpetuates prejudicial or stereotypical attitudes will be sufficient to es-
tablish discrimination, it is not necessary.98 Justice Abella noted that such 
a requirement would impose an “unquantifiable” or “ineffable” burden 
on claimants.99 The focus, she said, should remain resolutely on the im-
pact of the challenged law.100 
Third, drawing on Kapp and Withler, Abella J. clarified the other 
way, apart from proving the perpetuation of prejudice or stereotype, that 
a section 15(1) claimant may establish discrimination: by showing that 
the challenged differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground 
imposes a disadvantage on the claimant as a member of a group that has 
experienced a history of disadvantage: 
The root of s. 15 is our awareness that certain groups have been 
historically discriminated against, and that the perpetuation of such 
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discrimination should be curtailed. If the state conduct widens the gap 
between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of society 
rather than narrowing it, then it is discriminatory.101 
Justice Abella emphasized that a consideration of the purpose of the 
challenged provisions — whether they are well-motivated or reasonable 
in their promotion of the autonomy of de facto spouses, for example — 
properly belongs at the section 1 stage of the analysis.102 For this reason, 
she and the other members of the section 15(1) majority declined to follow 
the Court’s ruling in Walsh103 to the effect that Nova Scotia legislation 
extending family property rights only to married spouses did not violate 
the section 15(1) rights of unmarried couples.104 
After clarifying and adjusting the section 15(1) test in these ways, 
Abella J. was able to quickly conclude that the impugned provisions in-
fringed section 15(1). The law imposed disadvantageous treatment based 
on marital status on a group — de facto spouses — that had experienced 
historic disadvantage. Some de facto spouses were in relationships func-
tionally similar to some marriages, giving rise to similar forms of 
economic vulnerability. This was enough for Abella J. to conclude that an 
infringement of section 15(1) was established: 
The National Assembly enacted economic safeguards for spouses in 
formal unions based on the need to protect them from the economic 
consequences of their assumed roles. Since many spouses in de 
facto couples exhibit the same functional characteristics as those in 
                                                                                                             
101 Id., at para. 332. 
102 Id., at paras. 333, 335. 
103 Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 
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104 Quebec v. A., supra, note 34, at para. 338, per Abella J; at para. 384, per Deschamps J; 
and at para. 422, per McLachlin C.J.C. Justice Bastarache held in Walsh, id., that the provisions of 
the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275 did not discriminate on the basis 
of marital status by excluding unmarried couples from the statutory rights set out in the Act. Justice 
Bastarache found that the legislation was not discriminatory because it was aimed at respecting the 
choices made by married and unmarried conjugal couples. He summarized his conclusion at para. 62:  
[T]he extension of the MPA to married persons only is not discriminatory in this case as 
the distinction reflects and corresponds to the differences between those relationships and 
as it respects the fundamental personal autonomy and dignity of the individual. In this 
context, the dignity of common law spouses cannot be said to be affected adversely. 
There is no deprivation of a benefit based on stereotype or presumed characteristics 
perpetuating the idea that unmarried couples are less worthy of respect or valued as 
members of Canadian society. All cohabitants are deemed to have the liberty to make 
fundamental choices in their lives. The object of s. 15(1) is respected.  
Since a majority of the Supreme Court “declined to follow” the s. 15(1) analysis in Walsh, 
Bastarache J.’s conclusion on the s. 15(1) issue has been effectively overruled. 
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formal unions, with the same potential for one partner to be left 
economically vulnerable or disadvantaged when the relationship 
ends, their exclusion from similar protections perpetuates 
historic disadvantage against them based on their marital status.105 
In her opinion, Deschamps J. (Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. 
concurring) wrote that she agreed with Abella J.’s section 15(1) analysis.106 
In her brief additional comments, she made clear that establishing 
differential treatment on a prohibited ground that perpetuates historic 
disadvantage is sufficient to show an infringement of section 15(1) and to 
require the government to meet its burden of justification pursuant to 
section 1. The brevity and clarity of Deschamps J.’s section 15(1) analysis 
is reminiscent of the relative ease with which the Court found prima facie 
discrimination in cases involving statutory claims, like Meiorin and 
Moore. Here is Deschamps J.’s section 15(1) discussion in its entirety: 
The exclusion of de facto spouses from the protections provided for in 
the C.C.Q. [Civil Code of Quebec] perpetuates a historical disadvantage 
(Withler, at paras. 3, 35, 37 and 54). The Court has recognized the fact 
of being unmarried as an analogous ground because, historically, 
unmarried persons were considered to have adopted a lifestyle less 
worthy of respect than that of married persons. For this reason, they 
were excluded from the social protections. Even though society’s 
perception of de facto spouses has changed in recent decades and there 
is no indication that the Quebec legislature intended to stigmatize them, 
the denial of the benefits in question perpetuates the disadvantage such 
people have historically experienced (Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 
418, at para. 152). The Attorney General of Quebec therefore had to 
justify this distinction.107 
Recall that the O’Malley test for prima facie discrimination in the 
statutory realm requires the claimant to show that the challenged rule 
imposes adverse differential treatment based on a prohibited ground. 
The majority opinions on section 15(1) of Abella and Deschamps JJ.  
in Quebec v. A. likewise require a section 15(1) claimant to demonstrate 
adverse differential treatment on a prohibited ground that exacerbates 
historic disadvantage. Insofar as members of historically disadvantaged 
groups are concerned, these are essentially the same tests.  
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Chief Justice McLachlin, in her separate opinion, was the fifth mem-
ber of the majority finding a violation of section 15(1). The Chief Justice 
stated, without qualification, that she was in agreement with “the s. 15 
analysis set out in Abella J.’s reasons”.108 However, in her discussion of 
why section 15(1) was violated in this case, the Chief Justice’s emphasis 
on “the point of view of a reasonable person”,109 and on the “false stereo-
types”110 underlying the law, raise some doubt about whether she shares 
Abella and Deschamps JJ.’s view that the exacerbation of historic disad-
vantage on the basis of prohibited grounds is sufficient to meet the 
claimant’s section 15(1) case and move the analysis on to the govern-
ment’s burden of justification under section 1. Moreover, the ease with 
which the Chief Justice upheld the challenged provisions in their entirety 
pursuant to section 1111 raises concerns that the changes to the section 
15(1) test put forward by Abella J. in Quebec v. A. may not have an impact 
on the results of Charter equality rights cases. Even if the section 15(1) 
majority led by Abella J. holds in future cases, it may simply shift an  
approach that has been highly deferential to government from section 15 
to section 1. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The ruling in Quebec v. A. is the third instalment in the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s ongoing efforts to revise its section 15 jurisprudence 
to reduce the burdens on equality rights claimants. The Court recognized, 
beginning in Kapp, that its section 15 jurisprudence had placed burdens 
on equality rights claimants that were inimical to the achievement of 
section 15’s purpose of promoting substantive equality. Interpreting 
section 15 in light of its substantive equality purpose, the Court has 
emphasized that section 15(1) should prevent the exacerbation of 
disadvantage experienced by members of historically disadvantaged 
groups, and that section 15(2) should permit governments to initiate 
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he concluded that a s. 15(1) violation was therefore not made out, whereas the Chief Justice in 
Quebec v. A. concluded that equality rights were infringed but justifiably so pursuant to s. 1.  
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programs aimed at improving their situation.112 The purpose of section 
15 is to identify and transform persistent patterns of social exclusion and 
subordination on the basis of grounds that are unreliable markers of a 
person’s merits and capacities and generally irrelevant to legitimate 
government objectives.  
If legislatures and governments act contrary to the purpose of section 15, 
as they have throughout Canadian history, the substantive equality 
purpose of section 15 requires that members of disadvantaged groups 
have meaningful access to meaningful remedies. The Constitution has 
placed the primary responsibility for delivering those remedies on the 
courts. However, access to the courts is hindered by the high costs of 
litigation, and those costs are exacerbated, and access to remedies 
hindered, by high procedural, evidentiary or legal burdens imposed on 
claimants. A paradox lies at the heart of section 15: its chief intended 
beneficiaries, the most disadvantaged members of our society, are also the 
least likely to be able to afford to pursue litigation seeking vindication of 
their equality rights. Equality rights jurisprudence needs to be responsive 
to this paradox, even if it is not capable of resolving it on its own.  
The Court has acknowledged the need to reconsider its jurisprudence 
to ensure it is aligned with section 15’s substantive equality purposes. 
The first step in this process came in Kapp, when the Court jettisoned the 
human dignity test articulated in Law. The second instalment involved 
the rejection, in Withler, of the mirror comparator group requirement put 
forward in Auton and Hodge. In Quebec v. A., Justice Abella’s majority 
opinion on section 15(1) rejected the requirement of proving the 
operation of prejudice or stereotype set out in Kapp and Withler, and 
refused to follow the Court’s ruling in Walsh. These changes are all 
aimed at promoting section 15’s substantive equality purpose. The focus 
of section 15(1) analysis, Abella J. affirmed, should be on the effects of a 
challenged law and on transforming laws or government practices that 
have adverse differential impact on the members of historically 
disadvantaged groups.  
These important adjustments to the section 15(1) jurisprudence ought 
to relieve the burdens on section 15(1) claimants and allow the analysis 
to move more quickly to section 1, where government should have to 
show why it cannot achieve its objectives without imposing adverse 
differential impact on historically disadvantaged groups on the basis of 
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prohibited grounds. The substantive equality purpose of section 15 
requires that the Court be willing to hold the government to a meaningful 
burden of justification under section 1 when infringements of section 15 
are found. 
While we ought to applaud the Court’s willingness to undertake 
these important reconsiderations of section 15(1) doctrine, we should 
also retain a healthy dose of skepticism about whether they will actually 
produce different results. The best constitutional equality rights jurispru-
dence in the world is not going to help those who cannot afford the 
resources necessary to put the Court’s fine words to work. Section 15’s 
high aspirations are a cruel hoax if we cannot find effective ways to en-
able the most disadvantaged Canadians to put them into practice.  
The McLachlin Court’s record on Charter equality rights is distin-
guished by two features: one is its doctrinal plasticity, the remarkable 
series of about-turns and mea culpas one finds in the Court’s section 15 
rulings during the last decade. The recent adjustments to the jurispru-
dence are promising, but it is too early to say whether the Court will stay 
on the path it has charted. The dissenting opinion of LeBel J. in Quebec 
v. A., on behalf of four members of the Court, is a reminder that future 
section 15 rulings could continue to require disadvantaged Canadians to 
navigate complicated hurdles before the government is required to justify 
the imposition of further disadvantage on the members of groups that 
have endured persistent patterns of social subordination on the basis of 
irrelevant personal characteristics. The Chief Justice’s decisive opinion 
maintains some troubling elements of section 15(1)’s past, and takes a 
highly deferential approach to the government’s burden of justification 
pursuant to section 1.  
The other distinguishing feature of the McLachlin Court’s section 15 
jurisprudence is its consistent record of dismissing Charter equality 
rights claims, or denying leave to appeal to promising Charter equality 
rights claims, regardless of the operative test for discrimination at the 
time. In this sense, there is nothing new about Quebec v. A.; it is just an-
other example of the Court dismissing a Charter equality rights claim in a 
lengthy and complicated set of opinions.  
In light of the inaccessibility of Charter litigation, and the 
uncertainties produced by the instability and divisions in judicial 
approaches to section 15, statutory equality rights administered by 
human rights commissions and tribunals will continue to play a dominant 
role in promoting substantive equality. As we have seen, in recent years 
the contributions of human rights tribunals to the development of anti-
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discrimination law, and to the delivery of remedies to equality rights 
claimants, far outstrip the contributions courts have made in section 15 
rulings. The Court has wisely resisted calls made primarily by 
government lawyers to place new burdens on equality rights claimants in 
the statutory realm. In other words, the Court has not made the same 
mistakes in the context of statutory equality rights that have hindered the 
pursuit of substantive equality in the constitutional equality rights context. 
In cases like Meiorin and Moore, the Court has issued clear, confident and 
succinct rulings that have been successful in aligning the interpretation of 
statutory equality rights with the promotion of substantive equality. The 
Moore ruling, by affirming the simplicity of the O’Malley test for 
determining prima facie discrimination, should help forestall any further 
attempts to rely on Charter jurisprudence to elevate the burdens on 
equality rights claimants in the statutory context. The complete absence of 
the words prejudice or stereotype in Abella J.’s opinion in Moore, coupled 
with her removal of the need to prove the operation of prejudice or 
stereotyping from the section 15 test in her opinion in Quebec v. A., 
should help focus the statutory and constitutional tests alike on the goal of 
promoting substantive equality for members of disadvantaged groups.  
The division of labour between the claimant’s affirmative case of 
prima facie discrimination, and the defences and justificatory arguments 
available to respondents set out in leading cases such as O’Malley and 
Meiorin has proven to be flexible and effective in the adjudication of 
statutory equality rights. A similar approach can work just as well when 
adjudicating constitutional equality rights in the context of section 15 and 
section 1 of the Charter. There is no need to impose additional burdens on 
equality rights claimants in either the statutory or constitutional realms. In 
both contexts, members of historically disadvantaged groups should have 
to establish adverse differential treatment on the basis of prohibited 
grounds. The burden of establishing a defence or justification should then 
shift to respondents. The Court’s unanimous opinion in Moore, and the 
opinions for the section 15(1) majority in Quebec v. A., bring us two large 
steps closer to just such a harmonized approach, one that would spell the 
end of the strange double life of Canadian equality rights. 
